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Before the late 1980s, traditional contract law played virtually no role
in private litigation under section 10(b)' of the Securities Exchange Act
of 19342 and rule 10b-5.1 The reason was perceived incompatibility
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1. Section 10 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) [hereinafter § 10(b)].
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-(kk) (1988) [hereinafter 1934
Act].
3. Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
1942, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
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The 1934 Act is regulation intended to supersede "the philosophy of
caveat emptor,"4 whereas traditional contract law promotes bargaining
free of regulation.' In the late 1980s, however, the tide turned. Since
that time, private rule 10b-5 litigation has become riddled with the
vocabulary of traditional contract jurisprudence-the statute of frauds,6
merger clauses,7 attorneys' fees clauses,' choice of law clauses,9
releases,' 0 and the formation of an agreement." Thus, today lower
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994) [hereinafter rule 10b-5].
Neither rule lOb-5 nor § 10(b) expressly creates a private right of action. See supra
notes 1 and 3. Beginning with Kardon v National Gypsum Co., 69 F Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.
1946), however, lower federal courts implied a private action for violations of the rule. The
Supreme Court first recognized a private right of action under rule 10b-5 in Superintendent
of Ins. v Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). The Court has
subsequently observed that the "existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond
peradventure." Herman & MacLeanv Huddleston,459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). For discus-
sions of the Supreme Court's § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 jurisprudence, see David M. Phillips,
An Essay:Six Competing Currents of Rule 10b-5 Jurisprudence, 21 IND. L. REv 625(1988);
Margaret V Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 10b-5: Should Careless
Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REv 96 (1985); Steve Thel, The Original
Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv 385 (1990).
4. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct.
1439, 1445 (1994) (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v United States, 406 U.S. 128,
151 (1972)).
5. See GRANT GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT 6-7 (1974).
6. See cases cited infra note 24.
7 See cases cited infra note 28.
8. See cases cited infra notes 31 and 32.
9. See, e.g., Bonny v Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 161-62 (7th Cir. 1993); Riley
v Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir.) (upholding validity of
choice of law and forum selection clauses), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 658 (1992).
10. See, e.g., Finn v Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 821 F.2d 581 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (2-1
decision concerning validity of release), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 917 (1988).
11. See, e.g., Rudinger v Insurance Data Processing, Inc., 778 F Supp. 1334, 1338-39
(E.D. Pa. 1991) (finding agreement to exist); Southwest Realty, Ltd. v Daseke, [1990
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,256, at 96,173 (N.D. Tex. May 9, 1990)
(finding no agreement to exist).
THE TROJAN HORSE OF RULE 10b-5
federal courts1 2 often derail rule lOb-5 actions in reliance on the same
contract devices that earlier case law rejected as inimical to investor
interests. 13
Consider as an illustration the statute of frauds. It enters rule 10b-5
litigation in connection with whether the plaintiff has met the judicially
created requirement for standing"a-being a "purchaser" or "seller" of
securities. 15 The 1934 Act defines a "purchase" 6 to include a "contract
to purchase"' 7 and a "sale"'" to include a "contract to sell." 19 Yet the
1934 Act nowhere requires that these contracts be in writing.20 When a
rule lOb-5 plaintiff asserts standing to sue based on an oral contract, is the
state statute of frauds a valid defense? Early case law answered emphatic-
12. State courts have been thought to lack jurisdiction over private rule 1Ob-5 litigation
in accordance with the 1934 Act's exclusive jurisdictional grant in § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1988). For the argument that § 27 does not govern private rule lOb-5 actions, see Margaret
V Sachs, Exclusive Federal Jurisdictionfor Implied Rule 10b-5 Actions: The Emperor Has
No Clothes, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 559 (1988).
13. The author believes that private rule lob-5 litigation is a valuable tool for enforcing
the federal securities laws. See Sachs, supra note 3, at 132-37 (discussing enforcement
function of private rule lOb-5 actions). But cf. Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying-Private
Rights ofAction Underthe Federal SecuritiesLaws: The Commission'sAuthority, 107 HARv
L. REv 961, 971-74 (1994) (describing controversy over value of private rule lob-5
litigation).
14. The requirements for standing could not simply be inferred from the language of
§ 10(b) because the 1934 Congress did not contemplate private actions under that section.
See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
15. The Supreme Court upheld the purchaser-seller requirement in Blue Chip Stamps v
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975). This judicially created doctrine originated
in Birnbaum v Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952).
16. Section 3(a)(13) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1988) [hereinafter
§ 3(a)(13)].
17 Section 3(a)(13) provides: "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract
to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1988).
18. Section 3(a)(14) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1988) [hereinafter § 3(a)
(14)].
19. Section 3(a)(14) provides: "The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to
sell or otherwise dispose of." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1988).
20. See supra notes 17 and 19 (providing definitions of "purchase" and "sale" under
1934 Act).
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ally no: "Of course, state statutes of frauds do not bar recovery under [rule]
l0b-5.' ' 1 According to the view now gaining ground, however, an
investor with an oral contract lacks standing to sue." This view posits
that the statute of frauds for securities transfers in Article 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code' applies full force to rule lOb-5 and must be "enforced
rigorously "24
Merger clauses furnish a second illustration. Investors' contracts with
sellers and brokers commonly include a clause providing that the writing
supersedes any earlier representations or agreements, whether oral or
21. Fogarty v Security Trust Co., 532 F.2d 1029, 1034 (5th Cir. 1976). Courts
rejected the statute of frauds for the following reasons: remedial statutes such as § 10(b)
should be read broadly, e.g., Desser v Ashton, 408 F Supp. 1174, 1177 (S.D.N.Y
1975), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977); state law such as the statute of frauds is
irrelevant to a federal statute, e.g., Markovich v Vasad Corp., 617 F Supp. 142, 146
(E.D. Pa. 1985); a writing requirement for broker-customer transactions is impractical, see
Horst v W T. Cabe & Co., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,213,
at 92,463-64 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 31, 1977). Other cases rejecting the statute of frauds were
Reprosystem, B.V v SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257, 265 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 469 U.S.
828 (1984); Omega Executive Servs., Inc. v Grant, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 96,889, at 95,655 (S.D.N.Y May 25, 1979); Kingstone v Oceanography
Dev Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,387, at 93,347 n.7
(S.D.N.Y Apr. 11, 1978); cf. Threadgill v Black, 730 F.2d 810, 811-12 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(finding oral contract to suffice for standing, but without specifically mentioning statute of
frauds). But cf. Northland Capital Corp. v Silver, 735 F.2d 1421, 1427 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (spotting but not resolving question of applicability of statute of frauds); Geeting v
Prizant, 664 F Supp. 343, 346 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (same); Bartels v Algonquin Properties,
Ltd., 471 F Supp. 1132, 1149 (D. Vt. 1979) (same); Colonial Realty Corp. v Brunswick
Corp., 337 F Supp. 546, 553 (S.D.N.Y 1971) (same); Ross v Licht, 263 F Supp. 395,
400 (S.D.N.Y 1967) (same); but see Southeastern Waste Treatment, Inc. v Chem-Nuclear
Sys., Inc., 506 F Supp. 944, 955 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (upholding statute of frauds
requirement for rule lOb-5).
22. Dismissal would not be required, however, where the statute of frauds contains a
relevant exception. See Markovich, 617 F Supp. at 146 (statute of frauds would not bar
rule lob-5 action where the contract had been performed).
23. U.C.C. § 8-319 (1977).
24. Pommer v Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 1992). See Kagan v
Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 907 F.2d 690, 691 (7th Cir. 1990); Pelletier v Stuart-James
Co., 863 F.2d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir. 1989). But cf. Chariot Group, Inc. v American
Acquisition Partners, L.P., 751 F Supp. 1144, 1149 (S.D.N.Y 1990) (rejecting statute
of frauds in dictum but nonetheless dismissing action on ground that no contract existed),
aff'd mem., 932 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1992).
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written . 5 Suppose an investor nonetheless relies on oral representations.
If the investor later claims that the oral representations were fraudulent, is
the merger clause a valid defense? In the vast majority of early cases,
these clauses were not dispositive.26 Today, on the other hand, the
presence of a merger clause27 is virtually certain to lead to dismissal of an
investor's oral fraud action.28
25. For example, in Jackvony v RIHT Fin. Corp., 873 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1989), the
merger clause provided that the contract "constitutes the entire agreement and supersedes all
prior agreements and understandings, both written and oral with respect to the subject
matter." Id. at 416. Similarly, m One-O-One Enters., Inc. v Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283 (D.C.
Cir. 1988), the merger clause provided that the contract "supersede[d] any and all previous
understandings and agreements." Id. at 1285.
26. One court held that the presence of a merger clause was irrelevant to rule 10b-5,
citing both § 29(a) of the 1934 Act and the approach taken by common law fraud. See Lanza
v Drexel & Co., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,826, at 90,101
n.14 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 9, 1970), aft'd, 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973). The merger clause was
at most one factor for consideration at trial in the following cases: Rogen v Ilikon Corp., 361
F.2d 260, 268 (1st Cir. 1966); Doody v E.F Hutton & Co., 587 F Supp. 829, 832 (D.
Minn. 1984); Caliber Partners, Ltd. v Affeld, 583 F Supp. 1308, 1311-12 &n.6 (N.D. Ill.
1984); Esposito v Sweeney, No. 80-C-2861 (N.D. 1ll. May 13, 1982) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file); Allen Organ Co. v North Am. Rockwell Corp., 363 F Supp. 1117, 1127
(E.D. Pa. 1973). But cf. Zobrist v Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1517-18 (10th Cir. 1983)
(giving merger clause some consideration in dismissal); Rowe v Maremont Corp., 650 F
Supp. 1091, 1106 (N.D. Il. 1986) (attaching significance to absence of merger clause), aff'd
on other grounds, 850 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1988); NBI Mortgage Inv Corp. v Chemical
Bank, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,066, at 91,801 (S.D.N.Y
May 24, 1977) (finding merger clause to warrant dismissal, butpresenting alternative ground
for dismissal as well); but see Platsis v E.F Hutton & Co., 642 F Supp. 1277, 1299 (W.D.
Mich. 1986) (giving merger clause substantial weight in dismissal), aft'd, 829 F.2d 13 (6th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 962 (1988).
27 A merger clause with ambiguous wording is not given weight. See, e.g., Astor
Chauffeured Limousine Co. v Runnfeldt Inv Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1545-46 (7th Cir.
1990).
28. See, e.g., Jackvony v RIHT Fin. Corp., 873 F.2d 411,416 (1st Cir. 1989); One-O-
One Enters., Inc. v Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Davidson v Wilson,
763 F Supp. 1465, 1466-67 (D. Minn. 1990), aff'd, 973 F.2d 1391, 1401 (8th Cir. 1992);
Jankovich v Bowen, 844 F Supp. 743,747-49 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Becherer v Merrill Lynch
Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 799 F Supp. 755, 768 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Branch-Hess
Vending Servs. Employees' Pension Trust v Guebert, 751 F Supp. 1333, 1341 (C.D. Ill.
1990); Braunstein v. Berman, No. 89-5344, 1990 WL 192547, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 1990);
Arrizza v Jefferson Guar. Bank, 696 F Supp. 204, 208 (E.D. La. 1988); Taylor v Door
to Door Transp. Servs., Inc., 691 F Supp. 27, 35 (S.D. Ohio 1988); see also Pommer v
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Consider finally a clause obligating the investor to pay attorneys' fees
incurred by his seller or broker in connection with the sale or account.29
If the investor sues the seller or broker under rule lOb-5, does the clause
provide a basis for a counterclaim for attorneys' fees? The early cases on
this question produced a wide variety of answers.3 0 Recent cases are
Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Jackvony with approval); cf. Astor
Chauffeured Limousine Co. v Runnfeldt Inv Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1546 (7th Cir. 1990)
(noting that differently worded merger clause would bar oral fraud claim). But cf. Miltland
Raleigh-Durham v Myers, 807 F Supp. 1025, 1050 (S.D.N.Y 1992) (rejecting "general"
merger clause as defense to "specific" fraud allegations); Connor v First of Mich. Corp.,
[1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,350 (W.D. Mich. May 31, 1990)
(refusing to grant summary judgment to defendant on basis of merger clause).
29. For example, in Samuels v. Wilder, 871 F.2d 1346 (7th Cir. 1989), the clause
provided that the investor:
agrees to indemnify the Nominee and to hold Nominee harmless from all
liability, loss, expenses, damages, costs and attorney's [sic] fees that Nominee
may at any time incur by reason of any type of inquiry, action or suit which may
be brought against him or made of him [sic] by any person, firm, corporation,
or governmental agency or authority or anyone else by reason of the nominee-
ship.
Id. at 1351. In Chee v Marine Midland Bank, N.A., [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 95,806 (E.D.N.Y Jan. 29, 1991), the investor agreed "to indemnify and
hold [the broker] harmless from and to pay [the broker] promptly on demand any and all
losses." Id. at 98,878. Some fees clauses make the investors liable for attorneys' fees that
arise from their own false representations. See, e.g., Layman v Combs, 981 F.2d 1093,
1099 (9th Cir. 1992). Such representations may include that the investors had relied only
on the private placement memorandum and not on any oral statements. See id. Thus, in
the latter situation the attorneys' fees clause gives teeth to what amounts to a merger clause.
30. InTartell v. ChelseaNat'l Bank, 351 F Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'dpercuram,
470 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1972), the clause was held enforceable. See id. at 1079. In Jackson
v. Oppenheim, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976), the clause was held unenforceable on the
ground that it provided less notice than that in Tartell. See id. at 831, see also Ging v
Parker-Hunter, Inc., 544 F Supp. 49, 54 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (granting plaintiff's motion to
strike defendant's counterclaim for fees because fees clause was not sufficiently specific).
In Zissu v Bear, Steams & Co., 805 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1986), the clause was held
unenforceable for lack of specificity, but the court left open the question of whether such
a clause was objectionable on federal policy grounds that were not otherwise specified. See
id. at 79-80. In Doody v E.F Hutton & Co. 587 F Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1984), the court
rejected the clause because of its tendency to operate as a disincentive to sue. See td. at
833. In Maryville Academy v Loeb Rhoades & Co., 530 F Supp. 1061 (N.D. I11. 1981),
the court rejected the clause for reasons of "public policy" in connection with primary
liability, but not vicarious liability See id. at 1073.
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more consistent. Almost all perceive the validity of fees clauses as simply
a question of contract law, with the 1934 Act either irrelevant3' or else
satisfied by a clause that gives clear notice of its reach.32
Why does rule lOb-5 jurisprudence now embrace the contract law it
previously rejected? The turnabout is explainable, but not defensible. One
factor is the impact of the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Shearson/Am-
encan Express, Inc. v McMahon.33 Read narrowly, McMahon held only
that an investor with a rule lOb-5 claim is bound by an arbitration
clause.34 Yet McMahon left uncertain whether such an investor would
likewise be bound by other types of contract clauses. That McMahon
reached only arbitration clauses seemed to follow from the opimon's stress
on the strong federal policy favoring arbitration.35 Yet the opimon also
seemed to imply a tolerance of, or even an invitation to, the more general
use of contract law to defeat investors' claims.36 This broad reading of
McMahon is simply not viable, however, in the wake of the Court's 1989
31. See McGuire v Miller, I F.3d 1306, 1313 (2d Cir. 1993); Samuels v Wilder, 871
F.2d 1346, 1352 (7th Cir. 1989).
32. See, e.g., Layman v Combs, 981 F.2d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding notice
inadequate); Hill v Equitable Bank, No. 82-220-CMW, 1991 WL 169371, at *3 (D. Del.
Aug. 28, 1991) (same); Chee v Marine Midland Bank, N.A., [1990-91 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,806, at 98,881 (E.D.N.Y Jan. 29, 1991) (same); Stratmore
v Combs, 723 F Supp. 458, 463 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (same); see also Barnebey v E.F
Hutton & Co., 715 F Supp. 1512, 1521-22 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (denying plaintiff's motion
to hold clause unenforceable on the ground that plaintiff should be held to his contract);
McCain v Phoenix Resources, Inc., [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,834, at 94,531 (S.D.N.Y Nov 16, 1989) (deferring until trial question of sufficiency
of notice). But see Fulco v Continental Cablevision, Inc., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 95,345, at 96,672 (D. Mass. June 19, 1990) (finding clause unenforceable
because of insufficient notice and in the alternative because of its tendency to discourage
filing of rule 10b-5 actions).
No court has yet addressed whether an attorneys' fees clause is enforceable against an
investor who wins her case. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
For illustrative additional contract devices arising under rule lOb-5, see supra notes 9-
11 and accompanying text.
33. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
34. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
35. See id. at 225-27
36. McMahon confined analysis of § 29(a) to a hypertechnical examination of its
language. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
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decision in Rodriguez de Quijas v Shearson/Amencan Express, Inc.37
Although Rodriguez was a replay of McMahon within the context of the
Securities Act of 1933,38 the Court did not summarily rely upon Mc-
Mahon's reasoning. Instead, the Rodriguez Court prohibited waiver of any
1934 Act provision necessary to "place buyers of securities on an equal
footing with sellers,"'39 and thereby subordinated contract law to investor
protection. 40
The second factor is the influence of the law-and-economics movement,
which postulates generally that the ultimate social goal is wealth maxmuza-
tion41 (also known as efficiency) 42-- a goal whose achievement depends on
the enforcement of private contracts.43 Drumming the virtues of the law-
and-economics movement into the federal judiciary are Dean Henry Manne's
economics institutes for federal judges, of which one-third of presently
sitting federal judges are now graduates;' a cadre of former law-and-
economics academics-such as Judges Richard Posner and Frank Easter-
brook-appointed to the federal bench by President Reagan;45 and vast
quantities of current legal scholarship.' The United States Supreme Court
37 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
38. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(mrn) (1988) [hereinafter 1933 Act]. The
legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts is assembled in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (J.S. Ellenberger& Ellen
P Mahar eds., 1973) [hereinafterLEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
39. Rodriguezde Quijas v Shearson/Am.Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,481 (1989). The
Rodriguez Court found the arbitration clause enforceableon the ground that the clause did not
waive a protection that was essential to securities buyers. See id. at 483.
40. See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
41. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 13 (4th ed. 1992).
42. Id.
43. See id. at 13-15. An outcome is efficient if the gain to society exceedsthe loss. Id.
at 13-14.
44. This information, current as of June 30, 1993, comes from Professor Richard
Fielding, Director of the Law & Economics Center at George Mason University See also
Pamela Dwyer, Law and Economics:A New Order in the Court?, Bus. WK., Nov 16, 1987,
at 93 (stating that Manne claims 40% of sitting federal judges have attended his course).
45. See HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS 68-70, 89 (1988) (discussing
appointments of Posner and Easterbrook); Dwyer, supra note 44, at 93 (discussing Posner
and Easterbrook and their place in law-and-economics movement).
46. The impact of law-and-economics on legal scholarship is evident from the wide
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has, however, recently dealt the law-and-economics movement a blow by
holding that its precepts do not control the elements of rule lOb-5 The blow
came in the June 1993 decision in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v Employers
Insurance of Wausau.47 At issue in Musick was whether rule lOb-5 permits
a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. 4 In upholding this right,49
the Court expressly rejected all efficiency arguments that the parties' briefs
presented: "Our task is not to assess the relative merits of the competing
rules, but rather to infer how the 1934 Congress would have addressed
the issue had the lOb-5 action been included as an express provision in the
1934 Act. ,
50
Despite the Court's clear signals, there is the distinct possibility that
lower federal courts will ignore both Musick and Rodriguez. Indeed,
Rodriguez is widely cited for upholding arbitration provisions under the 1933
Act,5' but not for having broken with McMahon on how to determine when
an investor is contractually bound.52 Musick may well suffer an analogous
fate: renown for its approval of contribution coupled with disregard of its
rejection of efficiency
variety of subject areas in which "private ordering" has become analytically critical. See,
e.g., Michael I. Krauss, TortLaw and Private Ordering, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 623 (1991);
Marjorie M. Schultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70
CAL. L. REv 204 (1982); Michael E. Solimime, Forum-Selection Clauses and the
Privatization of Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 51 (1992).
47 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
48. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2086
(1993).
49. Id. at 2092.
50. Id. at 2089-90. In its 1994 decision rejecting aiding and abetting liability under
§ 10(b), the Court has again insisted upon the necessity of interpreting rule lob-5 consistent with
the intent of Congress: "The issue is not whether imposing private civil liability on aiders
and abettors is good policy but whether aiding and abetting is covered by the statute." Central
Bank of Denver, N.A. v First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1448 (1994).
51. See, e.g., Birdv ShearsonLehman/Am. Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116,118 (2d Cir.),
cert. dented, 501 U.S. 1251 (1991);A/S IvaransRedenv United States, 895 F.2d 1441,1446
(D.C. Cir. 1990); Utley v Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 186 (lst Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1045 (1990).
52. McMahon and Rodriguez are widely perceived as consistent. See, e.g., 2 THOMAS
L. HAZEN, THE LAv OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 14.4, at 247, 252-53 (Practitioners' ed.
1990); Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Securities Industry Arbitrations: An
lvamnation and Analysis, 53 ALB. L. REV 755,758-69 (1989).
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Lower federal courts should resist the allure of efficiency consider-
ations and come to terms with Musick and Rodnguez. Both decisions call
the federal securities laws back to their regulatory roots. In the wake of
these decisions, a court should import a contract device into rule 10b-5 only
if the device is demonstrably anchored in the language, history, or policies
of the 1934 Act.53
Part I contrasts the federal securities laws with the approach of law-
and-economics. The two diverge sharply, and to merge them carries a
price. The law-and-economics approach teaches that to maximize
efficiency one must maximize freedom of contract.54 Hence that approach
champions the use of traditional contract devices such as the statute of
frauds,5 merger clauses,56 and attorneys' fees clauses.57 These devices
53. The author believes that legislative history and statutory policies are essential to the
interpretation of the federal securities laws. See Margaret V Sachs, Are Local Governments
Liable Under Rule 1Ob-5? Textualism and Its Limits, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 19, 26-31 (1992)
(discussing importance in securities cases of legislative history and statutory purpose);
Margaret V Sachs, The International Reach of Rule lOb-5: The Myth of Congressional
Silence, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 677, 689-713 (1990) (using legislative history to
ascertain appropriate international reach of rule iOb-5); Sachs, supra note 3, at 126-37
(using statutory policies to determine whether rule 10b-5 private action should include
element of reasonable reliance). It is refreshing to see these matters given their due in
Musick and Rodriguez. Of course, the private action under § 10(b) was judicially implied
rather than expressly created by Congress. See supra note 3 (describing history of implied
right of action). Hence for matters peculiar to the § 10(b) private action, it is necessary to
deduce what Congress would have done had it created such an action. See Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1446 (1994)
(mentioning need to "infer how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue[s] had
the 10b-5 action been included as an express provision in the 1934 Act") (quoting Musick,
Peeler & Garrett v Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2090 (1993)). See
generally Sachs, supra note 3, at 114-140 (discussing methodology for deriving congressio-
nal intent).
54. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
55. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. The statute of frauds is thought to further
efficiency by eliminating the uncertainties of oral bargains. See infra note 125 and
accompanying text. Yet it abridges contractual freedom because the requirement of a writing
prevents the parties from choosing to have an oral contract. See Morton J. Horwitz, The
Transformation of American Law, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAw 250, 253-54
(Anthony T. Kronman & Richard A. Posner eds., 1979).
56. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
57 See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
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often derail rule 10b-5 actions,5" thereby benefiting defendants and the
status quo. 59 This in turn contributes to the creation of the very caveat
emptor world that the federal securities laws were intended to overcome.'
Parts II, III, and IV apply Musick and Rodriguez to the statute of
frauds, merger clauses, and attorneys' fees clauses in private rule lOb-5
litigation. Rule lOb-5 case law accepting these devices relies on efficiency
rationales and disregards both the statutory text on the one hand and the
realities of securities transactions on the other.61
Part V examines the cumulative consequences of derailing rule 10b-5
actions through the use of contract devices. The actions most at risk are
those involving transfers of close corporation stock,62 private place-
ments, 63 and customer-broker disputes.' These actions perform essen-
tial regulatory functions, and their derailment jeopardizes those functions.
L The Regulatory Nature of the 1934 Act
In its 1993 decision in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v Employers
Insurance of Wausau,65 the Supreme Court refused to allow law-and-
economics precepts to control the interpretation of the 1934 Act.66 At
issue in Musick was whether rule lOb-5 permits a right of contribution
58. For cases accepting a statute of frauds defense to rule lOb-5 actions, see supra note
24. For cases accepting a merger clause defense to rule lob-5 actions, see supra note 28.
For cases holding attorneys' fees clauses enforceable against rule lOb-5 plaintiffs, see supra
notes 31 and 32.
59. See generally Douglas M. Branson, A Corporate Paleontologist's Look at Law and
Economics in the Seventh Circuit, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv 745, 752-55 (1991) (showing that
law-and-economics approach is "Darwinian" at its core).
60. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
61. For a discussion of the statute of frauds defense to rule lOb-5, see Part II nfra. For
a discussion of the merger clause defense to rule lOb-5, see Part HI infra. For a discussion
of attorneys' fees clauses in rule 10b-5 litigation, see Part IV infra.
62. See cases cited infra note 297
63. See cases cited infra note 298.
64. See cases cited infra note 299.
65. 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
66. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2089-90
(1993).
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among joint tortfeasors.67 The parties' briefs urged that resolution of this
issue turned on whether a "contribution" rule or a "no contribution" rule
was more efficient.68  The Court's repudiation of this approach was
unequivocal: "Our task is not to assess the relative merits of the competing
rules, but rather to infer how the 1934 Congress would have addressed
the issue. "169
While the Musick Court refused to apply law-and-economics precepts
to rule lOb-5, it did not clarify the nature of the tensions between those
precepts and the underlying approach of the federal securities laws. This
Article offers a few general observations on those tensions in order to lay
a basis for discussing the use of the statute of frauds, merger clauses, and
attorneys' fees clauses in private rule 10b-5 litigation. These tensions are
pronounced with respect to (i) the need for federal regulation of the
securities markets; (ii) the extent to which investors could bargain
effectively in the absence of regulation; and (iii) the importance of
maximizing freedom of contract.
The law-and-economics movement perceives federal regulation at worst
to undermine efficiency, and at best to accomplish nothing more than the
free market would if the regulation did not exist. 0 The 1933 and 1934
Acts, of course, are the prime targets of this complaint. Enacted in the
wake of the 1929 Crash, the subsequent Depression, and the consequent
67 See id. at 2086. The Court upheld the right of contribution. See id. at 2092.
68. See id. at 2089.
69. Id. Musick is not inconsistent with Basic Inc. v Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
At issue in Basic was the certification of a rule lOb-5 class action involving reliance on
alleged misrepresentations. Id. at 241-49 The class action could not have gone forward if
each class member had been required to establish his own reliance, because then individual
issues would have predominated. Id. at 242. To avoid this result and facilitate the class
action, a plurality of the Court allowed the reliance of the plaintiffs to be presumed (subject
to rebuttal). Id. at 247-48. The presumption was based in significant measure on the
"efficient market hypothesis"-the idea that all available information concerning stock and
the companies that issue them is impounded m stock prices. Id. at241-42. Thus, economics
provided a basis for facilitating class actions on behalf of investors. Economics did not,
however, either create or negate an element of the cause of action. Nor did the Court
-xamme whether it was efficient to make investors statutory beneficiaries or to allow rule
lob-5 damages actions.
70. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 309-14 (1991).
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investor losses,7' the Acts represent Congress's judgment that neither state
laws nor stock exchanges, alone or together, could eliminate rampant
abuses in the securities industry 72
Consider next whether, in the absence of regulation, investors are able
to protect their own interests in securities transactions. The law-and-
economics movement posits that investors-like everyone else-can bargain
their way to beneficial private arrangements without government help.73
In contrast, the 1933 and 1934 Acts were enacted in significant measure for
the protection of investors.74
Finally, consider the importance of contractual freedom. The law-and-
economics movement seeks to multiply the choices open to bargaining
parties on the theory that to do so maximizes efficiency I5 The 1933 and
1934 Acts, on the other hand, are considerably more paternalistic. To be
sure, the Acts leave ample room for individual responsibility and foolish
investment choices. Indeed, they are designed largely to ensure that both
foolish and wise investment choices occur on a level playing field-a field
with mandatory disclosure, prohibitions on fraud, and controls on the
market and on credit.76
Yet restrictions on freedom of contract are nonetheless a significant
part of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Consider section 29(a) of the 1934 Act,77
71. See 1 LOuis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURiTiES REGULATION 169-71 (3d ed.
1989).
72. See id. at 193-225; see also id. at 171-80 (discussing various philosophies of federal
regulation from which Congress chose).
73. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 70, at 283.
74. The federal securities laws were intended not only to protect investors but also to
improve the functioning of the securities markets. See H.R. REP No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 2-5 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, item 18, at 2-5; S.
REP NO. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 38, item 17, at 2-5; H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933), reprinted in
2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, item 18, at 2-3; S. REP No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-2 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, item 17, at 1-2; see
also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988); Randall v Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S.
647, 664 (1986); Herman & MacLean v Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983).
75. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 10-12 (2d ed. 1990).
76. For an overview of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, see 1 LoSS & SELIGMAN, supra note
71, at 227-29.
77 Section 29(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1988) [hereinafter § 29(a)].
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which voids "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person
to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder. ,,78 Section 14 of the 1933 Act79 is virtually
identical.8" Standing alone, the Court's 1987 decision in Shearson/Amen-
can Express, Inc. v McMahons' appeared to emasculate section 29(a). 2
Yet in a portion of Rodnguez de Quijas v Shearson/Amencan Express,
Inc.13 that seems to be universally ignored,' the Court revisited McMah-
on and gave section 29(a) new life. 5
At issue in McMahon was whether section 29(a) invalidated an
arbitration clause contained in an investor's contract with his broker.8 6
According to the plaintiffs, the arbitration clause amounted to a waiver of
section 27,7 the 1934 Act's grant to the federal courts of subject-matter
jurisdiction over statutory violations.88 The Court rejected this argument
after hypertechmcally parsing the text of sections 29(a) and 27 89 The
Court stressed that section 29(a) voids waivers of "compliance" with any
provision of the 1934 Act,' whereas section 27 "does not impose any
duty with which persons trading in securities must 'comply "'91 The
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a)(1988).
79 Section 14 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1988) [hereinafter § 14].
80. Section 14 states that "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person
acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the
rules and regulationsof the Commission shall be void." 15 U.S.C. §77n(1988).
81. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
82. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,228 (1987); see infra notes
86-94 and accompanying text.
83. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
84. Id. at 481-83.
85. See ifra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
86. 482 U.S. at 227-28.
87 Section27 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988) [hereinafter§ 27].
88. Id. Section 27 provides in pertinent part: "The district courts of the United States
shall have exclusivejurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforceany liability or duty
created by this chapter or the rules and regulationsthereunder." 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988).
89 482U.S. at 228.
90. Id. (emphasisadded).
91. Id. (emphasis added).
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implication seemed clear that a similar parsing-type approach was
mandatory with respect to all contractual waivers of 1934 Act provi-
sions.' For this reason, and despite the stress elsewhere in the opinion
on the strong federal policy favoring arbitration,93 McMahon could be
read as suggesting a tolerance of, or even an invitation to, the more general
use of contract law to defeat investors' claims. 94
Two years later in Rodnguez,95 the Court faced a replay of McMahon
under section 14 of the 1933 Act,96 the counterpart to section 29(a) of the
1934 Act.97 Although upholding the enforceability of the arbitration
clause, the Rodrguez Court did not rest simply on the reasoning of
McMahon.9" Instead, the Court seemed to go out of its way to return to
the question of how to distinguish those contractual waivers that are
statutorily permissible from those that are not." The focus was no longer
on whether there had been a waiver of a statutory duty, but instead on
whether the investor had given up something necessary to "place buyers of
securities on an equal footing with sellers."""° The Court concluded that
the surrender of the right to litigate does not waive a right essential to
buyers. 101 The reason was that, thanks largely to the SEC's expanded
oversight of the procedures, 0 2 arbitration provides investors with ade-
quate protection. 03 Thus, in sharp contrast to McMahon, Rodrguez
92. See id.
93. See id. at 225-27
94. Professor Hillman makes this point with respect to McMahon. See Robert W
Hillman, Cross-Border Investment, Conflict of Laws, and the Privatization of the Securities
Laws, LAW & CONTEMP PROBs., Autumn 1992, at 331, 348. He does not distinguish
Rodriguez, however. See id.
95. Rodriguez de Quijas v Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
96. For the text of § 14, see supra note 80.
97 For the text of § 29(a), see supra text accompanying note 78.
98. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 481-83.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 481.
101. See id. at 482-83.
102. See id. at 483; see also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
231-34 (1987).
103. 490 U.S. at 483.
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provided lower courts with a policy reason for use in identifying invalid
contractual waivers.
Nor does section 29(a) give way even when a fully informed investor
freely chooses to surrender his rights. " As the McMahon Court ex-
plained, section 29(a) does not rest on contract principles:
The voluntariness of the agreement is irrelevant Section 29(a)
is concerned, not with whether brokers "maneuver[ed customers] into" an
agreement, but with whether the agreement "weaken[s] their ability to
recover under the [Exchange] Act." The former is grounds for revoking
the contract under ordinary principles of contract law; the latter is grounds
for voiding the agreement under section 29(a).i "
The federal securities laws contrast sharply with the approach of law-
and-economcs.0 6 Consequently, to merge them carries a price. The law-
and-economics approach teaches that to maximize efficiency one must
maximize freedom of contract.107 Hence the approach champions the use
of traditional contract devices such as the statute of frauds, 08 merger
clauses,'09 and attorneys' fees clauses."' These devices often derail rule
10b-5 actions, thereby benefiting defendants and the status quo."' This
in turn contributes to the creation of the very caveat emptor world that the
federal securities laws were intended to overcome.1
2
II. Contract Devices and Rule 10b-5 The Statute of Frauds
The statute of frauds enters rule 10b-5' litigation in connection with
whether the plaintiff has met the judicially created requirement for
104. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230 (1987).
105. Id. at 230-31 (citation omitted).
106. See supra notes 70-105 and accompanying text.
107 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
108. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
109. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
110. See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the statute of frauds,
merger clauses, and attorneys' fees clauses in rule lOb-5 litigation, see infra Parts II, II, and
IV, respectively
112. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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standing"-being a "purchaser" or "seller" of securities."' The 1934
Act defines a "purchase" to include a "contract to purchase"'1 5 and a
"sale" to include a "contract to sell.""' 6 Yet the 1934 Act nowhere
requires that these contracts be in writing.1 7 When a rule lOb-5 plaintiff
asserts standing to sue based on an oral contract, is the state statute of frauds
a good defense?
Statute of frauds defenses to rule 10b-5 actions are much more likely to
succeed today than before the late 1980s. The Supreme Court's 1987
McMahon decision" 8 was an important divide: with one exception,1
9
none of the pre-McMahon decisions accepted the defense."2 In contrast,
every post-McMahon decision that has had to rule on the question'2' has
accepted the defense." To justify the statute of frauds, courts rely on an
efficiency rationale derived from a misreading of the Supreme Court's 1975
decision in Blue Chip Stamps v Manor Drug Stores's as well as on a
specious construction of 1934 Act text. 24
The impetus to incorporate the statute of frauds into rule 10b-5 probably
has its roots in the law-and-economics movement. That movement gives the
statute of frauds high marks for furthering efficiency by eliminating the
113. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 17 (providing 1934 Act definition of "purchase").
116. See supra note 19 (providing 1934 Act definition of "sale").
117 See supra notes 17 and 19 (providing 1934 Act definitions of, respectively,
"purchase" and "sale").
118. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
119. See Southeastern Waste Treatment, Inc. v Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 506 F Supp.
944, 955 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
120. See cases cited supra note 21.
121. In Chariot Group, Inc. v American Acquisition Partners, L.P., 751 F Supp. 1144
(S.D.N.Y 1990), aff'd mem., 932 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1991), the action was dismissed on the
ground that no contract existed on which to premise standing. Chariot Group, 751 F Supp.
at 1149. The court noted in dictum that there was no statute of frauds requirement. Id.
122. See Kagan v Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 907 F.2d 690, 691 (7th Cir. 1990); Pelletier
v Stuart-James Co., 863 F.2d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Pommer v Medtest
Corp., 961 F.2d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 1992).
123. 421 U.S. 723 (1975); see infra notes 130-156 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 157-86 and accompanying text.
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uncertainties of oral bargains."~ Ironically, courts have failed to acknowl-
edge that the Article 8 statute of frauds is in a state of siege. Indeed, the
American Law Institute may soon eliminate it altogether from Article 8126
on the ground that it is not a realistic requirement for securities transac-
tions. 7 Moreover, courts have disregarded the poor fit between rule
lOb-5 and the statute of frauds," a matter of continuing significance
should the statute of frauds ultimately be retained in the Article 8 official
text, or, alternatively, in the laws of some or all of the states, despite its
removal from the official text.129
A. The Efficiency Argument
Courts favoring the statute of frauds for rule lOb-5 make an efficiency
argument on its behalf. 30 The argument is premised on the Supreme
Court's 1975 decision in Blue Chip Stamps,' which denied standing to
those claiming that fraud caused them not to trade.3 2 Thus, for example,
Judge Easterbrook analogized to Blue Chip Stamps in a 1990 Seventh Circuit
rule lOb-5 case involving the statute of frauds: "Blue Chip Stamps stressed
the substantial problems of proof and high risk of error entailed in litigating
claims that fraud prevented a sale from occurring. Statutes of frauds
likewise are concerned with problems of proof. It is easy to say that there
was an oral agreement."' 33
To be sure, it would be hard to argue against the statute of frauds if Blue
Chip Stamps truly gave a green light to any rule that enhanced efficiency by
125. See Horwitz, supra note 55, at 253.
126. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
127 See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 193-205 and accompanying text.
129 See 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3
at 7-8 (3d Practitioners' ed. 1988) (discussing "variations in enactment and in interpreta-
tion").
130. See cases cited supra note 133.
131. Blue Chip Stamps v Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
132. See id. at 747-49.
133. Kagan v Edison Bros. Stores, 907 F.2d 690, 691 (7th Cir. 1990) (emphasis in
original); see Pelletier v Stuart-James Co., 863 F.2d 1550, 1555 n.4 (11th Cir. 1989);
Southeastern Waste Treatment, Inc. v Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 506 F Supp. 944, 949,
952-53 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
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allaying "problems of proof" and "risk of error." But Blue Chip Stamps did
no such thing.
Blue Chip Stamps involved the doctrine of standing, which does not
purport to divide those harmed from those who were not. 34 Rather, it is
a "means of foreclosing actions by persons who have been hurt by wrongs,
but who, for reasons of legislative, judicial, or social policy, are outside of
the class of persons who are given a particular kind of remedy for the
injury "'" The Blue Chip Stamps Court could not make the standing
requirements for private plaintiffs turn solely on the language of section
10(b)'36 because the Congress that enacted that section did not anticipate
private actions. 37  Instead, the Court focused primarily on a policy
important to the 1934 Congress-13 -the need to reduce vexatious litiga-
tion. 13 While conceding that some rule lOb-5 violations injure those who
have neither purchased nor sold,"4° the Court concluded that a prohibition
against lawsuits by non-purchasers and non-sellers was an appropriate means
of curbing vexatious litigation. 41 Two reasons were given.
The first reason was that rule 10b-5 litigation presented an especially
grave threat of vexatiousness: "[T]he mere existence of an unresolved
lawsuit has settlement value to the plaintiff not only because of the
possibility that he may prevail on the merits but because of the threat of
extensive discovery and disruption of normal business activities which may
134. See Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 146 (9th Cir. 1973)
(Hufstedler, J., dissenting), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
135. Blue Chup Stamps, 492 F.2d at 146.
136. The language of § 10(b) was not altogether irrelevant to the Blue Chp Stamps
decision. The Court found at least some support for the purchaser/seller requirement in the
words "in connection with the purchase or sale" of any security " See Blue Chip Stamps,
421 U.S. at 733.
137 See Blue Chip Stamps v Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975); cf.
Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2090 (1993)
(noting that "the text of § 10(b) provides little guidance [regarding] elements or aspects
of the lob-5 apparatus unique to a private liability arrangement").
138. See id. at 740-41.
139. See id. This policy emerged from an amendment to § 11 of the 1933 Act enacted
in 1934 as part of Title II of the 1934 Act. See id.
140. Id. at 743.
141. See id. at740-49.
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accompany a lawsuit which is groundless. ,142 Hence the purchas-
er/seller requirement
separates m a readily demonstrable manner the group of plaintiffs who
actually purchased or actually sold, and whose version of the facts is
therefore more likely to be believed by the trier of fact, from the vastly
larger world of potential plaintiffs who might successfully allege a claim
but could seldom succeed in proving it. 143
The Court stressed, however, that the threat of vexatiousness did not
suffice by itself to justify the purchaser/seller requirement or any other
requirement: "[T]here is no general legal principle that courts in fashioning
substantive law should do so in a manner which makes it easier for a
defendant to obtain a summary judgment. But in this type of litigation,
such a factor is not to be totally dismissed." 14
Because the first reason was insufficient by itself, the second reason
became critical. The second reason was that without the purchaser/seller
requirement, the plaintiff's case would turn on evidence that could not be
verified. 145 Indeed, if non-purchasers and non-sellers could sue under
rule lOb-5, the defendants would ordinarily have no way of ascertaining the
actual reasons for the plaintiffs' failure to trade. 46 Such litigation would
present "[t]he very real risk that the door [would] be open to
recovery of substantial damages on the part of one who offers only his own
testimony to prove that [the defendant's] representations damaged
him."147 To prevent this result, the Court held that rule lOb-5 plaintiffs
must be either purchasers or sellers of securities."'48
Contrary to current lower court decisions,' 4 9 the purchaser/seller
requirement does not provide an analogy for the statute of frauds. The
reason is that when a plaintiff asserts an oral contract as the basis for her
standing, she does not offer evidence that only she controls. Indeed, the
142. Id. at 742-43.
143. Id. at 743.
144. Id. at 742-43 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 746.
146. See id.
147 Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
148. See id. at 749
149. See cases cited supra note 133.
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defendant has equal access to the evidence concerning the contract's
existence or nonexistence and is well-situated to respond.
50
To be sure, to prohibit standing based on oral contracts would
inevitably eliminate at least some frivolous claims. But that by itself does
not bring the statute of frauds within the ambit of Blue Chip Stamps. For
all of its rhetoric about vexatious litigation, Blue Chip Stamps was careful
not to give a general green light to rules that would prevent investors from
proving their cases. That proof could proceed unless the evidence was
inherently unverifiable.15' Confirmation of this interpretation of Blue
Chip Stamps came in the Court's 1991 decision in Virginia Bankshares,
Inc. v Sandberg.'52 There the plaintiffs challenged as fraudulent the
reasons given by directors for supporting a merger."53 The defendants
advanced an efficiency argument based on Blue Chip Stamps: litigation of
"reasons" was said to "invite wasteful litigation of amorphous issues
outside the readily provable realm of fact." 54 The Court flatly rejected
the argument. In its view, Blue Chip Stamps was inapposite because the
evidence relevant to the litigation of reasons was "subject neither to a
plaintiffs control nor ready manufacture. "55 Hence the Court concluded
that statements of reasons were actionable as fraud under the federal
securities laws. 1
56
150. Cf. Desser v Ashton, 408 F Supp. 1174, 1176 (S.D.N.Y 1975) (noting that
other witnesses were available to confirm or refute existence of alleged oral contract),
aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977); Desser v. Ashton, [1976-77 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 95,653, at 90,235 (S.D.N.Y July 16, 1976)
(dismissing rule lOb-5 claim because alleged oral contract was not proven).
151. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
152. 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
153. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1088-89 (1991).
This case was brought under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988), and
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1994), the fraud provisions for proxy solicitations.
154. See Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1091.
155. Id. at 1094.
156. See id. at 1095. The Court went on to say that a fraudulently stated reason was
actionable only where it misled concerning its subject. Id. at 1096. This requirement was
deemed necessary because "the temptation to rest an otherwise nonexistent action on
psychological enquiry alone would threaten just the sort of strike suits and attrition by
discovery that Blue Chip Stamps sought to discourage." Id. In the Court's view, this
additional requirement "do[es] not substantially narrow the cause of action." Id.
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B. The Textual Argument
Courts favoring the statute of frauds also rely upon the language of the
1934 Act."s They claim that the contracts included in the statutory
defimtions of "purchase" '158 and "sale"'15 9 are limited to those that satisfy
the statute of frauds." 6 Thus, for example, Judge Easterbrook has said:
"'Contract' in the securities acts is a word of legal art. Without signed
writings, consideration, and the other legal requirements for enforcement,
there is no 'contract;' there is only a promise."'' Yet Judge Easterbrook
does not purport to derive his interpretation from the language, history, or
policies of the federal securities laws and hence he leaves unaddressed the
following crucial questions: (i) as a matter of general contract law in 1934,
did the word "contract" apply to an agreement that failed to satisfy the
statute of frauds? 62 (ii) was there in 1934 a statute of frauds applicable to
securities contracts? 63 and (iii) why were "contracts" included within the
1934 Act's definitions of "purchase" and "sale"'71
64
In the 1930s the word "contract" embraced both enforceable and
unenforceable agreements. Consider the following language from the first
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, published in 1932: "The term contract
is generic. As commonly used, and as here defined, it includes varieties
described as voidable, unenforceable, formal, informal, express, implied,
unilateral, bilateral." 65 Moreover, the 1932 Restatement defined an
"unenforceable contract" as "one which the law does not enforce by direct
legal proceedings, but recogmzes in some indirect or collateral way as
creating a duty of performance,"'" and gave as an example a contract
157 See cases cited infra note 160.
158. For the statutory definition of "purchase," see supra note 17
159 For the statutory definition of "sale," see supra note 19.
160. See, e.g., Kagan v Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 907 F.2d 690, 691 (7th Cir. 1990);
Pelletier v Stuart-James Co., 863 F.2d 1550, 1555 (ilth Cir. 1989).
161. Kagan, 907 F.2d at 691.
162. See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
165. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. e (1932) [hereinafter 1932
RESTATEMENT] (emphasis added).
166. Id. § 14.
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failing to satisfy the statute of frauds.67 Additional contemporaneous
sources recognizing unenforceable contracts as contracts were the Uniform
Sales Act 168 and the 1933 Webster's Dictionary "
In addition, there was considerable uncertainty in 1934 about whether
securities contracts were even subject to a statute of frauds. There was then
no UCC,170 and only the Uniform Sales Act-not adopted by one-third of
the states '7'-provided an even arguably relevant statute of frauds."
That statute of frauds applied not just to goods but to choses in action, 1
a category that encompassed securities in the view of a number of
courts. 74 Yet the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that under the state
constitution the statute of frauds could not apply to securities transfers
because the Act's title gave traders in securities insufficient notice that they
were covered in any respect. 75 Moreover, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts expressed uncertainty as to whether the statute of frauds
applied to contracts involving securities that were unissued as of the contract
date. 76 Thus, if Congress had favored a writing requirement for contracts
within the 1934 Act, it could not have assumed that the unsettled state law
167 Id. § 14 illus. 3.
168. See, e.g., Edwards Mfg. Co. v Bradford Co., 294 F 176, 181-82 (2d Cir. 1923);
Abraham v Durward, 180 N.W 783, 785-86 (N.D. 1920); Ashley v Preston, 39 S.W.2d
279, 279 (Tenn. 1931).
169. The word "contract" was defined as "[a]n agreement between two or more persons
to do or forbear something, esp. such an agreement that is legally enforceable;
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 578 (1933).
170. The UCC first appeared in 1952. 1 U.L.A. iii (1989).
171. See I WHrIE & SUMMERS, supra note 129, § 1, at 3.
172. UNIF SALES ACT § 4 (act superseded 1952).
173. See id. § 4(1).
174. See, e.g., De Nunzio v De Nunzio, 97 A. 323, 324 (Conn. 1916); Woolley v
Loose, 194 P 908, 911-12 (Utah 1920).
175. See Guppy v Moltrup, 126 A. 766, 767 (Pa. 1924). The court noted that the title
of the Uniform Sales Act was "fa]n act relating to the sale of goods." Id. at 766. The
following year, the Pennsylvania legislature came to terms with Guppy by amending the title
to read "an act relating to the sale of goods and choses in action." 69 PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
14.69, § 1 n.1 (1931) (repealed 1953). This change is discussed in Howell v McCloskey,
99 A.2d 610, 612 n.1 (Pa. 1953). The constitutional vulnerability presumably would have
continued in other jurisdictions, however.
176. See Davis v Arnold, 165 N.E. 885, 888 (Mass. 1929).
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of the period would furnish the requirement. Instead, it would have had to
enact a special federal statute of frauds as a part of the 1934 Act. Its failure
to take this step indicates that it never intended a writing requirement for
1934 Act contracts in the first place.
Furthermore, contracts appear to have been included in the 1934 Act's
definitions of "purchase" and "sale" for a reason that militates against the
statute of frauds requirement. Congress's purpose must have been to protect
the investor who acts to his detriment by assuming that his contract is a "done
deal."'" If -this is correct, the word "contract" should not presuppose
satisfaction of the statute of frauds, because the statute can so easily become
a "cunning device" for use against investors. Indeed, if only written con-
tracts sufficed, unscrupulous securities sellers and brokers could simply keep
contracts oral in the hopes of defeating the investor's standing later on. 7'
The 1934 Congress was aware of dangers of this kind. Concerned that
sellers would try to escape their 1933 Act obligations by failing to issue
securities certificates to investors, it amended the 1933 Act definition of the
term "security" in 1934 to make that impossible. Indeed, as originally
enacted in 1933, "security" included "any instrument commonly known as a
security ,179 By amendment in 1934, this phrase was changed to "any
interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security' 1118o The 1934
Act Conference Report explained that the intent was to have the 1933 Act
reach "interests commonly known as 'securities' whether or not such interests
are represented by any document or not. Thus the [1933 Act] will apply to
inscribed shares, and its provisions cannot be evaded by simply refraimng
from issuing to the subscriber any documentary evidence of his interest."'I8
To be sure, the 1934 Act retained the phraseology "any instrument commonly
177 In Blue Chip Stamps v Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Court
acknowledged that holders of contracts have standing to sue under rule lob-5 because the
1934 Act's definitions of "purchase" and "sale" include executory contracts. See id. at 751.
The Court did not address why it is that these definitions include contracts. See id.
178. Conceivably some such sellers and brokers might prefer a written contract if it
contained an unfair bargain that they wished to enforce.
179. 1933 Act, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, 74 (1933), reprinted in I LEGISLATrVE HISTORY,
supra note 38, item 1, at 74.
180. 1934 Act, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 905 (1934), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATiVE HISTORY,
supra note 38, item 1, at 905 (emphasis added).
181. H.R. CoNF REP No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1934), reprinted in 5
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 38, item 20, at 39.
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known as a 'security' ,it" but this cannot represent the judgment that
anti-investor tactics unacceptable under the 1933 Act were somehow
acceptable under the 1934 Act. The 1933 Act was directed principally at
primary distributions, and the failure to issue certificates probably seemed a
more likely tactic in this context than in the context of secondary trading, the
subject of the 1934 Act."85
Finally, even if today's definitions controlled construction of the word
"contract" as used in the 1934 Act, a statute of frauds requirement would not
thereby become more plausible. Consider a contract that is unenforceable
because it does not satisfy the statute of frauds in Article 8 of the
UCCIn-the very statute of frauds urged for rule lOb-5 185 According
to the UCC, this "[f]ailure does not render the contract void for all
purposes, but merely prevents it from being judicially enforced in favor of
a party to the contract. "18 6
C. Difficulties Specific to UCC Section 8-319
Courts favoring a statute of frauds requirement for rule lOb-5 endorse
section 8-319 of the UCC. Is These courts fail to acknowledge that the
Article 8 statute of frauds is currently in a state of siege. Indeed, the
American Law Institute is currently in the process of revising Article 8,188
with section 8-319 a probable candidate for outright abolition.189  The
182. 1934 Act, ch. 404,48 Stat. 881, 883 (1934), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 38, item 1, at 883.
183. For an overview of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, see 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 71,
at 227-29.
184. See U.C.C. § 8-319 (1977).
185. See, e.g., Pommer v MedtestCorp., 961 F.2d 620,625 (7th Cir. 1992); Kaganv
Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 907 F.2d 690, 691 (7th Cir. 1990); Pelletier v Stuart-James Co.,
863 F.2d 1550, 1555 (11 th Cir. 1989); SoutheasternWaste Treatment, Inc. v Chem-Nuclear
Sys., Inc., 506 F Supp. 944, 951 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
186. U.C.C. § 2-201, official cmt. 4 (1990). The policies of § 2-201 are expressly
incorporated into U.C.C. § 8-319. See U.C.C. § 8-319 official cmt. 1 (1977); see also 7
WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 8-319.09 at 400 (1986)
(discussing effect of noncompliance with U.C.C. § 8-319).
187 See cases cited supra note 185.
188. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTICLE 8. INVESTMENT SECURITIES
(Proposed Final Draft April 5, 1994) [hereinafter Article 8 Proposed Final Draft].
189. See id. § 8-113. Section 8-113 provides in pertinent part as follows: "A contract
for the sale or purchase of a security is enforceable whether or not there is a writing
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reason for the proposed abolition is the perception that the requirement of
a writing is not realistic for securities transactions:
With the increasing use of electronic means of communication, the statute
of frauds is becoming even less suited to the realities of the securities
business. For securities transactions, whatever benefits the statute of
frauds may play in filtering out fraudulent claims are outweighed by the
obstacles it places in the development of modem commercial practices in
the securities business."9
In contrast to this explicit attention to actual business realities, courts
endorsing the statute of frauds for rule lOb-5 do not even question the
practicality of the requirement that they impose.91
Moreover, rule lOb-5 fits poorly with section 8-319, a matter of
continuing significance should section 8-319 ultimately be retained in the
Article 8 official text, or, alternatively, in the laws of some or all of the
states, despite its removal from the official text."92 The poor fit results
from several important differences between the 1934 Act and Article 8.
First, the 1934 Act and Article 8 have distinct agendas. The 1934 Act
is aimed at "compensating defrauded investors. [d]eter[ring] fraud and
manipulative practices in the securities markets, and ensur[ing] full
disclosure of information material to investment decisions." 93 None of
these matters is addressed by Article 8. Instead, it focuses on something
Section 8-113, official comment 1 states: "This section provides that the statute of
frauds does not apply to contracts for the sale of securities, reversing prior law " Cf.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTICLE 8, INVESTMENT SECURITIES, reporter's
introductory note 6 (Draft February 5, 1992) ("The Reporter suggests that consideration be
given to deleting the statute of frauds provision now found in § 8-319.").
Article 2 of the UCC (the sale of goods) is currently in the process of revision as well.
See An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the Uniform Commercial Code
Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP L. 981, 1039 (1991). As with Article 8, outright
abolition of the statute of frauds is a distinct possibility See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
REVISED ARTICLE 2. SALES, § 2-201, reporter's note (Draft July 29-Aug. 5, 1994) (stating
that "[t]he statute of frauds for contracts is repealed").
190. Article 8 Proposed Final Draft, supra note 188, § 8-113 official cmt. 2.
191. See cases cited supra note 24. This Art1cle does not purport to resolve the question
of the practicality of a statute of frauds for securities transactions. It merely notes that
current rule 10b-5 case law does not acknowledge the question.
192. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
193. Randall v Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986).
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the federal securities laws leave alone-facilitating the transferability of
securities. 194
Second, on a more practical level, section 8-319 may fail to reach some
of the very rule lOb-5 cases in which statute of frauds issues are most likely
to arise: those involving a transfer of close corporation stock 95 or a
customer-broker dispute.'96
The problem with injecting Article 8 into rule lOb-5 cases involving
close corporation stock derives from the fact that Article 8 and the 1934
Act do not define "security" in precisely the same way The official
comment to the Article 8 definition stresses the point:
This definition has no bearing upon whether an interest is a "security" for
purposes of the federal securities laws. By the same token the definitions
of "securities" for purposes of those laws has [sic] no bearing upon
whether an interest is a security within the definition of this Article."9
Under the 1934 Act, close corporation stock is a security,' 98 whereas
state courts are divided over whether close corporation stock is a security
for purposes of Article 8.199
194. See U.C.C. § 8-101, official cmt. (1977); see also 7 HAWKLAND, supra note 186,
§ 8-101:01, at3.
195. See cases cited infra note 297
196. See cases cited infra note 299.
197 U.C.C. § 8-102, official cmt. 3; see 7 HAWKLAND, supra note 186, § 8-101:01, at
3; Ernest L. Folk, Some Problems UnderArticle 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 5 ARiz.
L. REv 193, 199-200 (1964).
198. See Landreth Timber Co. v Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 692 (1985) (holding that stock
is a "security" under federal securities laws even when its sale is privately negotiated and
transfers control). But cf. Marine Bank v Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 (1982) (holding that
"unique agreement, negotiated one on one by parties, is not a security").
199. See, e.g., Robert C. Mendelson, Investment Securities Review, 45 Bus. LAW
2461, 2473-74 (1990) (discussing split in case law); Note, Stock in a Closely Held
Corporation: Is It A Security for Unform Commercial Code Purposes?, 42 VAND. L. RV
579, 582-95 (1989) (same). The two lines of cases draw upon different aspects of the
official comments. Compare U.C.C. § 8-102 official cmt. 2, first paragraph, (noting that
"a security is a share or participation in an enterprise or an obligation that is of a type
commonly traded in organized markets") with id., third paragraph (asserting that stock in
close corporation is a security under Article 8). But cf. Article 8 Proposed Final Draft, supra
note 188, § 8-102(13)(iii) (defining a "security" as an obligation "dealt in or traded on
securities exchanges or securities markets" or, in the alternative, as "a medium for investment
[which] by its terms expressly provides that it is a security governed by this Article").
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The problem with merging Article 8 into rule lOb-5 cases involving
customer-broker disputes derives from the difference between the two
statutory schemes concerning the treatment of principals and agents.
Section 8-319 applies only to a contract of a broker who buys or sells on
his own behalf rather than as an agent for the customer.2' Chancellor
Hawkland explains:
In most cases, a customer interacts with his broker on a principal-agent
basis; the broker acts as the agent for his customer m the purchase or sale
of securities. Unless the broker is buying or selling for himself, his
transaction with a customer is not a sale [under the UCC]. Therefore,
agreements between a broker and his customers generally are not within the
Article 8 statute of frauds and need not be in writing.20 1
Rule lOb-5, on the other hand, does not make this distinction. The rule
applies to any broker committing fraud in connection with his customer's
purchase or sale of a security, regardless of whether the broker acts on his
own behalf or as the customer's agent.20 2
Third, recogmtion of section 8-319 as a defense to a rule 10b-5 action
confers upon this section a greater reach in federal law than it has in at
least some states. The reason is that state courts are divided over whether
section 8-319 provides a defense to actions for common law fraud.2 3 In
states where section 8-319 is not a defense to common law fraud, its
recognition as a defense to rule lOb-5 assaults the very state law principles
purportedly being respected. Moreover, in such states a notice problem
would arise because plaintiffs will have had no advance warning of the state
law "requirement" that caused them to lose their right to sue under rule
lOb-5.204
200. See 7 HAWKLAND, supra note 186, § 8-319:02, at 384.
201. Id. (footnote omitted).
202. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 302-03
(1985) (rule 1Ob-5 claim against broker acting as agent).
203. CompareKastlev Steibel, 502N.Y.S.2d538, 540 (N.Y. App. Div 1986) (allowing
fraud clan) with Mildfelt v Lair, 561 P.2d 805, 813-14 (Kan. 1977) (disallowing fraud
claim). State courts are also divided on this question with respect to § 8-319's Article 2
counterpart. See Note, The Statute of Frauds as a Bar to An Action in Tort for Fraud, 53
FORDHAM L. REv 1231, 1234 & nn. 19 & 22 (1985) (showing split of authority).
204. Cf. supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing sufficiency of notice to
securities traders, prior to enactment of UCC, of applicability of statute of frauds).
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Nor would it be appropriate to import section 8-319 into rule 10b-5
only where the state in question recogmzes section 8-319 as a defense to
common law fraud. In the frequent situation involving several jurisdic-
tions, significant conflict of laws problems would arise. More importantly,
to allow standing under rule lOb-5 to vary state by state flies in the face of
the uniformity of interpretation that has always characterized construction
of the rule.20 5
Thus, the statute of frauds requirement for rule 10b-5 is completely
inappropriate. It is rooted neither in the language of the 1934 Act2 nor
in the policies embodied in the Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip
Stamps.207 And, section 8-319-at present seemingly close to oblivi-
on20 8-ls in any event not co-extensive with rule 10b-5.2' 9
Ill. Contract Devices and Rule 10b-5. Merger Clauses
Investors' contracts with sellers and brokers commonly include a clause
providing that the writing supersedes any earlier representations or
agreements, whether oral or written.210 Suppose an investor nonetheless
relies on oral representations. If the investor later claims that the oral
representations were fraudulent, is the merger clause a valid defense?
This defense is much more likely to succeed today than before the late
1980s. 211 And McMahon2i2 is again the divide. The vast majority of
pre-McMahon cases did not treat merger clauses as dispositive. 1 3 On the
other hand, every post-McMahon case has treated merger clauses as a
205. One significant exception to this uniformity had been the limitations period, which
looked to state law. See Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1976)
(dictum). The Supreme Court has recently substituted a uniform federal limitations period.
See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 354-62 (1991).
206. See supra notes 157-86 and accompanying text.
207 Blue Chip Stamps v Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); see supra notes 130-
56 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 192-205 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
212. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
213. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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complete defense, or close to it, 214 with only one case parting compa-
ny215 and another deferring the question of the effect of the clause until
trial.2"6 Current rule lOb-5 cases endorsing merger clause defenses
invoke efficiency considerations either expressly 217 or indirectly through
the medium of the rule lOb-5 element known as reasonable reliance. 218
This endorsement of merger clauses is not prompted by state law, which
is split over the wisdom of derailing an oral fraud action in order to enforce
a merger clause. 219 Rather, the impetus seems to come from the law-and-
economics movement. That movement posits that in order to promote
efficiency, writings should trump oral statements.20
A. The Explicit Efficiency Argument
Some spirited arguments in favor of merger clauses have rested
expressly on efficiency considerations. One such argument was made by
Judge Kozinski in a 1992 Ninth Circuit case in which he urged that
"[1]etting parties warrant that they are relying only on those offering
materials would avoid the cost, uncertainty, and delay of securities
litigation." 1 Judge Kozinski argued that merger clauses should be
214. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
215. See Miltland Raleigh-Durham v Myers, 807 F Supp. 1025, 1050 (S.D.N.Y 1992)
(rejecting "general" merger clause as defense to "specific" fraud allegations).
216. See Connor v First of Mich. Corp., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,350, at 96,689 (W.D. Mich. May 31, 1990).
217 See infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
218. See infra notes 230-37 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 484 (2d ed. 1990); 1 WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 129, § 2-12, at 113. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts stands
firmly opposed to the defense. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214, cmt. c
(1981). Comment c provides: "What appears to be a complete and binding integrated
agreement may be a forgery, a joke, a sham, or it may be voidable for fraud Such
invalidating causes are not affected by a merger clause." Id. § 214, cmt. c.
220. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 70, at 307
221. Layman v Combs, 981 F.2d 1093, 1107 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozmski, J., dissenting
for the most part). At issue was the enforceability of an attorneys' fees clause. The clause
in question made the investors liable for attorneys' fees that arise on account of the investors'
false representations. These representations included that the investors relied only on the
private placement memorandum and not on any oral statements. See id. at 1099. Thus, the
attorneys' fees clause put teeth in what amounted to a merger clause. For this reason, Judge
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binding on investors unless the investors give specific advance notice to the
contrary to the sellers: "Had they relied on oral representations made by
the sellers, they could (and should) have said so before the money was paid
and the securities delivered. "I Judge Kozinski does not address whether
it is reasonable to expect investors to ferret out a merger clause from a
voluminous offering document of considerable complexity I In the case
before him, for example, the merger clause was one of twenty-two
"representations and warranties" spanning "more than three pages of single-
spaced type. " 4
Also worthy of note are Judge Easterbrook's comments in a 1988
Seventh Circuit case on a matter closely analogous to merger clauses:2
A seller who fully discloses all material information in writing should be
secure in the knowledge that it has done what the law requires
Otherwise even the most careful seller is at risk, for it is easy to claim:
"Despite what the written documents say, one of your agents told me
something else." If such a claim of oral inconsistency were enough,
sellers' risk would be greatly enlarged. All buyers would have to pay a
risk premium to cover this extra cost of doing business. 6
Neither Judge Easterbrook nor Judge Kozinski purported to anchor
these efficiency considerations in the text or policies of the 1934 Act. 7
The implication is that the omission is inconsequential because efficiency
considerations are simply rules of reason that the 1934 Act can readily
Kozinski chose to address the rationale for merger clauses.
222. Id. at 1108.
223. Judge Kozinski did not apply his analysis only to the members of some financially
astute inner circle: "We may blunt the cutting edge of this principle when one of the parties
is illiterate, or subject to economic duress, or when we see legal filigree buried deep within
a long, printed contract." Id. at 1106.
224. Id. at 1098.
225. Acme Propane, Inc. v Tenexco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir. 1988). At issue was
whether a writing should take precedence over an inconsistent oral statement. See id. at
1322; see also Ryan v Wersi Electronics GmbH & Co., 3 F.3d 174, 183 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that reasonable investor would not consider particular oral statements material in
light of writings that he had received).
226. Acme, 844 F.2d at 1322.
227 See Acme Propane, Inc. v Tenexco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir. 1988); Layman
v Combs, 981 F.2d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J., dissenting for the most part).
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countenance. This position is no longer tenable after the Supreme Court's
Musick decision.' Musick held that the 1934 Act must be construed in
accordance with the intent of Congress rather than the precepts of law-and-
economics. 29
B. The Efficiency Argument By Indirection: Reasonable Reliance
Some courts uphold merger clauses by invoking efficiency consider-
ations indirectly through the medium of the rule lOb-5 element known as
reasonable reliance.-" To show reasonable reliance, a rule lOb-5 plaintiff
must establish that she acted reasonably-typically defined as without
recklessness'31--in relying on the alleged fraud. 2  On the theory that a
plaintiff cannot reasonably rely on oral statements when his contract contains
a merger clause, courts dismiss oral fraud actions in which a merger clause
is present?131
The District of Columbia Circuit's 1988 decision in One-O-One Enter-
prises, Inc. v Caruso 4 is illustrative. The plaintiffs claimed that fraudu-
lent oral representations induced them to enter into a contract with the defen-
dants.' 5 Affirming the dismissal of the action for failure to state a claim,
Judge (now Justice) Ruth Bader Ginsburg insisted that the plaintiffs could not
have reasonably relied on the oral representations in view of the contract's
merger clause (referred to as the "integration clause"). 6 But she did not
let the matter rest with reasonable reliance. Instead, she made it plain that
228. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
229 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
230. See cases cited infra note 233.
231. E.g., Molecular Technology Corp. v Valentine, 925 F.2d 910,918 (6th Cir. 1991).
232. See id., Grubb v FDIC, 868 F.2d 1151, 1164 (10th Cir. 1989). See generally
Sachs, supra note 3, at 111-14 (discussing currentjudicial approaches to reasonable reliance).
233. See, e.g., Jackvonyv RIHT Fin. Corp., 873 F.2d411, 416 (lstCir. 1989); One-O-
One Enters., Inc. v Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Jankovich v Bowen,
844 F.Supp. 743,747-49 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Branch-Hess Vending Servs. Employees' Pension
Trust v Guebert, 751 F Supp. 1333, 1341 (C.D. Ill. 1990); Arrizza v Jefferson Guar.
Bank, 696 F Supp. 204, 208 (E.D. La. 1988); cf. Becherer v Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 799 F Supp. 755,768 (E.D. Mich 1992) (finding merger clause to invalidate
oral fraud claim without expressly invoking reasonable reliance requirement).
234. One-O-One Enters., Inc. v Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
235. See id. at 1286.
236. See id.
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the real issue for her was efficiency- "Were we to permit plaintiffs' use of
the defendants' prior representations (and defendants' nondisclosure of
negotiations inconsistent with those representations) to defeat the clear words
and purpose of the Final Agreement's integration clause, 'contracts would
not be worth the paper on which they are written.'I
Judge Ginsburg's approach does not take account of certain practical
realities. First, under the general contract law of many states, a merger
clause does not bar an action for oral fraud." Therefore, a plaintiff in
those states, who knew of the state law, would hardly be reckless in
assuming that, under federal law, a merger clause would likewise not bar his
oral fraud action. Even an investor who lacked such knowledge would not
be reckless in assuming that federal law protected him from oral fraud. He
might reason that prosecution of fraud would take precedence over
enforcement of a merger clause.3 9
Moreover, any assessment of whether it is reasonable to rely on oral
fraud must also reckon with the possibility that oral statements are by their
nature more seductive than writings. Indeed, the interpersonal dimension
may make an oral statement seem more persuasive than would a written
statement, 24° or it may reduce the likelihood that the investor will evaluate
the statement dispassionately 241 Courts ought to assess the reasonableness
of an investor's reliance in light of this psychological reality
C. The Judicial Disregard of Section 29(a)
Current rule 10b-5 decisions upholding merger clause defenses disregard
section 29(a) of the 1934 Act. 42 In all probability, these courts perceive
237 Id. at 1287 (quoting Tonn v Philco Corp., 241 A.2d 442, 445 (D.C. 1968)).
238. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
239. This logic is employed by some state courts that disallow merger clause defenses to
oral fraud. See 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 129, at 124 & n. 12.
240. Cf. Zauderer v Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985)
(observing that attorney's written advertisement "will lack the coercive force of the personal
presence of a trained advocate").
241. Cf. td. (observing that written advertisement, "unlike a personal encounter initiated
by an attorney, is not likely to involve pressure on the potential client for an immediate
answer").
242. See cases cited supra note 28. Judge Kozinski mentions § 29(a) briefly in dissent,
but then dismisses it. See Layman v Combs, 981 F.2d 1093, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting for the most part).
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section 29(a) through the lens of McMahon, ignoring the Supreme Court's
correction in Rodriguez.24
Recall that McMahon gave a hypertechical parsing to the language of
section 29(a),2" which voids "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter
or of any rule or regulation thereunder."245 McMahon stressed that section
29(a) invalidates contracts that waive "compliance" with a provision of the
1934 Act,2' thereby focusing attention on whether the provision in
question imposes a duty to comply 247 Applying this approach to an
arbitration clause, the Court found no conflict with section 29(a). The
provision purportedly waived was the grant of federal subject matter
jurisdiction, which did not impose any "duty with which persons trading in
securities must 'comply "'248
Recall further that the Court took an altogether different approach m
Rodriguez,249 which was a replay of McMahon under section 14 of the
1933 Act," 0 the counterpart to section 29(a) of the 1934 Act."s  The
Court no longer focused on whether there had been a waiver of a duty to
comply Instead, the focus shifted to whether the investor had given up
something necessary to "place buyers of securities on an equal footing with
sellers. "2 The Court concluded that the surrender of the right to litigate
did not waive a right essential to buyers. 3 The reason was that, thanks
243. Several pre-McMahon cases spotted a conflict between merger clauses and § 29(a).
See Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 268 (1st Cir. 1966); Esposito v Sweeney, No.
80-C-2861 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 1982) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI) 92,826, at 90,101 n.14
(S.D.N.Y Oct. 9, 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
244. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
245. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1988).
246. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
247 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
248. Id.
249. Rodriguez de Quijas v Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
250. See supra note 80 (providing text of § 14).
251. See supra text accompanying note 78 (providing text of § 29(a)).
252. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 481, see supra note 100 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
THE TROJAN HORSE OF RULE lOb-5
largely to the SEC's expanded oversight of arbitration procedures,'
arbitration accords investors adequate protection 55
Considered alone, McMahon pointed towards voiding the merger clause
if construed as a waiver of the defendant's duty under section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 not to engage in oral fraud. 6 But a court could instead have
construed the merger clause as a waiver of the plaintiffs right to sue for oral
fraud. Seen in this light, the merger clause could be analogized to the
McMahons' waiver of their right to litigate-a waiver that the McMahon
Court upheld.' Admittedly, this analogy is somewhat strained: the merger
clause would deprive the plaintiff of all fora in which to pursue his oral
fraud claim, whereas an arbitration clause eliminates one forum (judicial) but
preserves another (arbitral). Yet McMahon provided no policy reason for
use in discounting strained analogies, or, more generally, to guide the choice
between pro-investor and anti-investor constructions.
Now consider the impact of Rodriguez. The analogy between a merger
clause and an arbitration clause is no longer tenable because the merger
clause's preclusion of all fora is significantly more anti-buyer than the
arbitration clause's preclusion of the judicial forum alone. Moreover, after
Rodriguez nothing turns upon whether the merger clause is seen as a waiver
of the defendant's statutory duty or of the plaintiff's right to sue. Viewed
either way, enforcement of the clause significantly compromises the "equal
footing" of buyers and sellers.
Nor is it arguable that a merger clause defense is appropriate at least in
the situation where the investor knew at the time he signed the contract that
the merger clause would preclude an oral fraud lawsuit. The McMahon
Court disposed of this argument when it held that once an agreement is
invalid under section 29(a), "[t]he voluntariness of the agreement is
irrelevant. "258
The courts must reject the merger clause defense to rule 10b-5 actions.
Efficiency arguments on behalf of this defense are inadequate in the wake of
254. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
256. Cf. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 253 n.9 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing that majority "implies
that the literal language of § 29(a) does not apply to an investor's waiver of his own
action").
257 Id. at 238.
258. Id. at 230.
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Musick.2 9 Moreover, merger clause enforcement cannot be reconciled
with section 29(a) of the 1934 Act. 210
IV Contract Devices and Rule 10b-5. Attorneys' Fees Clauses
Investors' contracts with sellers and brokers commonly include a clause
obligating the investor to pay any attorneys' fees that the seller or broker
incurs in connection with the sale or account. 26 1 These clauses typically
do not contain any reciprocal obligation on the part of the seller or broker
to pay the attorneys' fees of the investor.262 When these clauses entitle
a seller or broker sued under rule lOb-5 to file a counterclaim for
attorneys' fees, sigmficant consequences follow To see why, first consider
the allocation of attorneys' fees in the absence of an attorneys' fees clause.
Because the 1934 Act is silent concerning attorneys' fees under section
10(b),263 federal common law rules applicable to federal claims in federal
court control this matter.2 4 Under these rules, the losing party pays only
his own fees unless the court determines that he acted in bad faith.265
Now consider the allocation of attorneys' fees when an enforceable
attorneys' fees clause is present: in that instance, an investor who loses
must pay the defendant's fees even when he sued in good faith. 266 To be
sure, no court has yet addressed whether an attorneys' fees clause is
259. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2089
(1993) (rejecting efficiency considerations in determining whether right of contribution
exists among joint tortfeasors in rule 10b-5 private damages actions).
260. See supra notes 242-58 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
262. See id.
263. In 1934, Congress had no reason to address attorneys' fees under § 10(b) because
private actions under that section were not contemplated. See supra note 137 and
accompanying text.
264. See generally Alyeska Pipeline Serv Co. v Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,257-
59 (1975). These rules do not apply to diversity cases. See id. at 259 n.31.
265. See id., Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SEcURrriES REGULATION 1045 (2d ed.
1988).
266. An investor who loses his case cannot be assumed to have acted in bad faith.
Indeed, defeat at trial-or even before trial-hardly establishes that an action should never
have been brought.
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enforceable against an investor who wins her case. 7 But because an
investor cannot know in advance that she will win, the presence of an
attorneys' fees clause threatens a penalty that makes it more likely that she
will withdraw the lawsuit prior to judgment or, alternatively, not file it at
all.268 If the investor nonetheless perseveres, the attorneys' fees clause
will operate as a penalty if she loses.269
Rule lOb-5 case law involving attorneys' fees clauses is moving
towards consensus, and once again in the wake of McMahon.27 Pre-
McMahon cases generated a wide variety of results. 27 1 Post-McMahon
cases are more consistent. Almost all perceive the validity of fees clauses
as simply a matter of contract law, with the 1934 Act as either irrele-
vant272 or as satisfied by a clause that gives specific notice of its
reach.27 Judicial tolerance of these clauses is not prompted primarily by
state law While attorneys' fees clauses are enforceable under the law of
267 Cf. Layman v Combs, 981 F.2d 1093, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 1992) (regarding it as
ludicrous to enforce clause under such circumstances); Barnebey v E.F Hutton & Co., 715
F Supp. 1512, 1521 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (noting that defendants seek enforcement of attorneys'
fees clause only if plaintiffs lose).
268. Some courts attempt to rebut this argument by maintaining that if an attorneys' fees
clause truly deterred litigation, the action then being adjudicated would never have been filed.
See, e.g., Barnebey v E.F Hutton & Co., 715 F Supp. 1512, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1989). But
this contention does not dispose of the possibility that other actions that might otherwise have
been filed were instead deterred.
269. See, e.g., Samuels v Wilder, 871 F.2d 1346, 1352 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding clause
enforceable and rejecting public policy objection to enforcement on ground that "the loss
(litigation expenses) resulted from a successful defense of a suit brought by plaintiffs");
Tartell v Chelsea Nat'l Bank, 351 F Supp. 1071, 1079 (S.D.N.Y 1972) (holding clause
enforceable and noting that plaintiff "must be charged with realization of the covenant
language and awareness that his claims might be found wanting on the merits"), aff'dper
curtam, 470 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1972). Sometimes the threat hangs over the trial. See, e.g.,
McCain v Phoenix Resources, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,834 at 94,531 (S.D.N.Y Nov 16, 1989) (deferring until trial question of whether
attorneys' fees clause was specific enough to be enforceable); Barnebey v E.F Hutton &
Co., 715 F Supp. 1512, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (denying plaintiffs motion to strike
counterclaim to enforce attorneys' fees clause).
270. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). For a discussion
of McMahon, see supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
271. See cases cited supra note 30.
272. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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most states, 274 this is so only in the absence of a countervailing stat-
ute.275 In all likelihood, the rule lOb-5 case law tolerates attorneys' fees
clauses as the result of the influence of the law-and-economics movement
and the emphasis the movement places on the enforcement of private
choices.276
A. Treating the 1934 Act As Irrelevant
In a 1989 rule lOb-5 case, Judge Mamon observed on behalf of the
Seventh Circuit that if the plaintiff had "any reservations about the scope
of the [attorneys' fees clause] he should have insisted upon other
language."277 Judge Mamon effectively treated the 1934 Act as irrele-
vant.
Judge Mamon's view is mistaken. The validity of attorneys' fees
clauses must be controlled by federal law because these clauses pose a
threat to rule lOb-5's enforcement. The controlling role of federal law
follows from the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Bateman Eichler, Hill
Richards, Inc. v Berner 278 At issue in Eichler was the availability in a
private rule lOb-5 action of the common law defense of in pan delicto.279
Stressing that private actions are "a necessary supplement to Commission
action,"280 the Court subordinated the in pan delicto defense to enforce-
ment considerations. 281 To this end, it established a two-pronged test that
permits the defense only when rule lOb-5's enforcement will not be
compromised thereby 282 A privately negotiated contract clause with the
capacity to thwart the enforcement of rule lOb-5 283 must likewise be
governed by federal principles.
274. See 2 STUART M. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES § 15:3 (1973 & Supp. 1988).
275. See id. § 15:7
276. See supra notes 41-43, 73 and accompanying text.
277 Samuels v Wilder, 871 F.2d 1346, 1352 (7th Cir. 1989); see McGuire v Miller, I
F.3d 1306, 1313 (2d Cir. 1993) (recovery under attorneys' fees clause in rule 10b-5 action
depends on whether "the contract is valid under applicable state law").
278. 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
279. BatemanEichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 301 (1985).
280. Id. at 310 (quoting J.I. Case Co. v Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).
281. Id. at310-11.
282. Id., see Sachs, supra note 3, at 133-34 (discussingtwo-prong test).
283. See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
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B. Accommodating the 1934 Act Through Enhanced Notice
Some current rule lOb-5 decisions concede that the validity of an
attorneys' fees clause is not simply a matter of state contract law
According to these decisions, the 1934 Act can be accommodated by a
clause that provides clear notice of its coverage of attorneys' fees in rule
lOb-5 litigation.' The cases that impose an enhanced notice requirement
are quite uninformative about precisely what aspect of the 1934 Act the
notice accommodates. Most of the cases simply duck the question. 5
The cases are vaguer still about how an enhanced notice requirement
resolves these largely unspecified conflicts with the 1934 Act.2"6 Presum-
ably, the idea is that an investor who signs a contract that contains a crystal-
clear attorneys' fees clause can be assumed to have acted freely and
voluntarily, and hence it seems fair, not to mention efficient, to enforce the
clause against him. Thus, the decisions that accommodate the 1934 Act
through enhanced notice are grounded ultimately in contract principles. No
serious consideration is given to the practical impact of these clauses-
whether they operate as an incentive not to sue, as pressure to ternunate
actions early, or as a penalty for investors who sue and lose."s
Grounded in contract principles, these decisions fail to come to terms
with the fact that freedom of contract cannot overcome section 29(a).11
Indeed, attorneys' fees clauses and section 29(a) are irreconcilable. With
an attorneys' fees clause, the investor gives up an important protection-not
having to pay her opponent's attorneys' fees unless the court first deter-
mnnes that she acted in bad faith.289 To be sure, section 29(a) refers to
the waiver of a 1934 Act "provision,"219 and the surrendered protection
stems from federal common law that comes into play through the 1934
Act's silence.291 This does not make section 29(a) irrelevant, however.
284. See cases cited supra note 32.
285. One case made reference, bereft of citation or elaboration, to "preserv[ing] the
power of securities purchasers to enforce their rights." See Stratmore v Combs, 723 F
Supp. 458, 461 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
286. See cases cited supra note 32.
287 See id.
288. See id. For the text of § 29(a), see text accompanying note 78.
289. See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
290. See supra text accompanying note 78 (providing text of § 29(a)).
291. See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV 879 (1994)
In its Rodnguez decision, the Court eschewedliteralism in the construction
of section 29(a) and its 1933 Act counterpart. 2' It is thus fair to read
section 29(a) as encompassing a waiver not only of a 1934 Act "provision"
but also of a protection that arises as the result of statutory silence.
Rodnguez, of course, held that section 29(a) voids waivers of matters
necessary to "place buyers of securities on an equal footing with sell-
ers. "293 Judicial oversight of fee-shifting is clearly a matter of this sort.
Indeed, Congress has made clear its view that this oversight is crucial.
Each of the fee-shifting provisions in the express fraud provisions of the
1933 and 1934 Acts294 is designed so that the losing party is not responsi-
ble for his opponent's fees unless his bad faith is established to the court's
satisfaction.295 Congress evidently judged that to shift fees to losing
litigants as a matter of course would discourage private enforcement.
In short, attorneys' fees clauses under rule lOb-5 should not be
enforced. These clauses waive rights necessary to investor protection in
violation of section 29(a).
V Cumulative Consequences
Sigmficant cumulative consequences of incorporating contract devices
into rule lOb-5 emerge upon categorizing the cases. The fifty-six cases
involving the statute of frauds, merger clauses, and attorneys' fees clauses
are not a random assortment.296 A full 80% involved transfer of close
292. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
293. Rodriguez de Quijas v Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989); see
supra note 100 and accompanying text.
294. The three provisions are contained m § 9(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e)
(1988) [hereinafter § 9(e)], § 18(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1988) [hereinafter
§ 18(a)], and § 11 (e) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1988) [hereinafter § 11 (e)]. The
fee-shifting aspect of § 11 was enacted by the 1934 Congress as an amendment to the 1933
Act. See Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), reprntedin 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 38, item 1, at 908; see also Blue Chip Stamps v ManorDrug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,753-
54 (1975).
295. For a discussion of fee-shifting in §§ 11(e), 9(e) and 18(a), see LOSS, supra note
265, at 1046-47
296. No distinction is made here as to whether the statute of frauds, merger clause, or
attorneys' fees clause arose by way of holding, dictum, or merely as an issue that the court
spotted but did not pursue. Two cases were counted twice because two of the devices came
up m each: Pommer v Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 1992) (statute of frauds
and merger clause) and Doody v E.F Hutton & Co., 587 F Supp. 829, 832-33 (D. Minn.
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corporation stock (30%),29 private-placements (34%),298 or customer-
1984) (merger clause and attorneys' fees clause).
297 The following cases involved the transfer of close corporation stock and the statute of
frauds: Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1992); Kagan v Edison Bros.
Stores, Inc., 907 F.2d 690 (7th Cir. 1990); Threadgill v. Black, 730 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(finding an oral contract to suffice for standing, but without specifically mentioning the statute
of frauds); Reprosystem, B.V v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1984); Fogarty v
Security Trust Co., 532 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1976); Chariot Group, Inc. v. American
Acquisition Partners, L.P., 751 F Supp. 1144 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff"dmem., 932 F.2d 956 (2d
Cir. 1991); Geeting v. Prizant, 664 F Supp. 343 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Markovich v Vasad Corp.,
617 F Supp. 142 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Southeastern Waste Treatment, Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Sys.,
Inc., 506 F Supp. 944 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Omega Executive Servs., Inc. v. Grant, [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,889 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1979); Desser v
Ashton, 408 F Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'dmem., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977); Ross
v. Licht, 263 F Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
The following cases involved the transfer of close corporation stock and a merger clause:
Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1992); Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co.
v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540 (7th Cir. 1990); One-O-One Enters., Inc. v. Caruso,
848 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Braunstein v. Berman, No. 89-5344, 1990 WL 192547
(D.N.J. Sept. 12, 1990); Taylor v. Door to Door Transp. Servs., Inc., 691 F Supp. 27 (S.D.
Ohio 1988).
Thus, 17 of the 56 cases, or 30%, involved the transfer of close corporation stock.
298. The following cases involved private placements and the statute of frauds: Northland
Capital Corp. v. Silver, 735 F.2d 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Bartels v. Algonquin Properties, Ltd.,
471 F Supp. 1132 (D. Vt. 1979); Kingstone v. Oceanography Dev. Corp., [1978 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,387 (S.D.N.Y. April 11, 1978).
The following cases involved private placements and a merger clause: Zobrist v. Coal-X,
Inc., 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983); Becherer v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
799 F Supp. 755 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Miltland Raleigh-Durham v. Myers, 807 F Supp. 1025
(S.D.N.Y 1992); Davidson v. Wilson, 763 F Supp. 1465 (D. Minn. 1990), aff'd, 973 F.2d
1391, 1401 (8th Cir. 1992); Caliber Partners, Ltd. v. Affeld, 583 F Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ill.
1984); Esposito v. Sweeney, No. 80-C-2861 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 1982) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file); NBI Mortgage Inv Corp. v. Chemical Bank, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 96,066 (S.D.N.Y May 24, 1977).
The following cases involved private placements and an attorneys' fees clause: Layman v.
Combs, 981 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992); Samuels v. Wilder, 871 F.2d 1346 (7th Cir. 1989);
Zissu v. Bear, Steams & Co., 805 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1986); Hill v. Equitable Bank, No. 82-220-
CMW, 1991 WL 169371 (D. Del. Aug. 28, 1991); Fulco v Continental Cablevision, Inc.,
[1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,345 (D. Mass. June 19, 1990); McCain
v Phoenix Resources, Inc., [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII) 94,834
(S.D.N.Y Nov 16, 1989); Stratmore v. Combs, 723 F Supp. 458 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Barnebey
v. E.F Hutton & Co., 715 F Supp. 1512 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Tartell v. Chelsea Nat'l Bank, 351
F Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 470 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1972).
Thus, 19 of the 56 cases, or 34%, involved private placements.
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broker disputes (16%).2 99 The remainder either fell into other categories
or could not be classified on the basis of the information gien.3°°
This distribution is not surprising. Private placements and transfers of
close corporation stock occur off the public securities markets, and hence
are more likely than transactions on those markets to be the result of face-
to-face negotiations. Moreover, an investor typically negotiates with her
broker the terms of their ongoing relationship. Indeed, other contract
issues-such as the formation of an agreement30' or the validity of a
release3°2 or choice of law clause 3" 3-are apt to reflect a similar distri-
bution.
299. The following cases involved a customer-broker dispute and the statute of frauds:
Pelletier v Stuart-James Co., 863 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1989); Horst v W.T. Cabe & Co.,
[1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,213 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 31, 1977).
The following cases involved a customer-broker dispute and a merger clause: Connor
v First of Mich. Corp., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,350 (W.D.
Mich. May 31, 1990); Platsis v E.F Hutton & Co., 642 F Supp. 1277 (W.D. Mich. 1986);
Doody v E.F Hutton & Co., 587 F Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1984).
The following cases involved a customer-broker dispute and an attorneys' fees clause:
Chee v Marine Midland Bank, N.A., [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,806 (E.D.N.Y Jan. 29, 1991); Doody v E.F Hutton & Co., 587 F Supp. 829 (D.
Minn. 1984); Ging v Parker-Hunter, Inc., 544 F Supp. 49 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Maryville
Academy v Loeb Rhoades & Co., 530 F Supp. 1061 (N.D III. 1981).
Thus, 9 of the 56 cases, or 16%, involved customer-broker disputes.
300. See McGuire v Miller, 1 F.3d 1306 (2d Cir. 1993) (merger agreement); Jackvony
v RIHT Fin. Corp., 873 F.2d 411 (lst Cir. 1989) (not clear whether corporation is publicly
held); Jackson v Oppenheim, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976) (privately negotiated sale of
publicly held stock); Rogen v Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966) (same); Jankovich
v Bowen, 844 F Supp. 743 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (company in the process of going public);
Branch-Hess Vending Servs. Employees'Pension Trustv Guebert, 751 F Supp. 1333 (C.D.
Ill. 1990) (not clear whether corporation is publicly held); Arrizza v Jefferson Guar. Bank,
696 F Supp. 204 (E.D. La. 1988) (same); Rowe v Maremont Corp., 650 F Supp. 1091,
1106 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (privately negotiated sale of publicly held stock), aff'd, 850 F.2d 1226,
1234 (7th Cir. 1988); Allen Organ Co. v North Am. Rockwell Corp., 363 F Supp. 1117
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (not clear whether corporation is publicly held); Colonial Realty Corp. v
Brunswick Corp., 337 F Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y 1971) (public offering); Lanza v Drexel &
Co., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,826 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 9, 1970)
(exchange of close corporation stock for public stock), aff'd, 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
301. For illustrative rule lob-5 cases on the formation of an agreement, see supra note
11.
302. For an illustrative rule lob-5 case on releases, see supra note 10.
303. For illustrative rule 10b-5 cases on choice of law clauses, see supra note 9.
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The distribution is cause for concern. The reason is that rule 10b-5
actions involving close corporations, private placements, and customer-
broker disputes perform unique functions, and the derailment of these
actions jeopardizes those functions.104
A. Pnvate Placements and Transfers of
Close Corporation Stock
The 1933 and 1934 Acts extend beyond the public markets to reach
privately negotiated transactions. 5 While such transactions are typically
exempt from the registration requirements, 3 6 they are nonetheless subject
to the fraud provisions. Indeed, section 10(b) and its 1933 Act counterpart,
section 17(a),30 7 extend by their terms to all secunties transactions, on
and off the public markets.30 8
The Supreme Court has been vigilant in upholding the applicability of
the fraud provisions to transactions off the public markets. The Court's
decision in Landreth Timber Co. v Landreth is illustrative. The Court
held that section 10(b) extends to a privately negotiated sale of the stock of
a close corporation.310 It flatly rejected the argument that the "[1933 and
1934] Acts were intended to cover only 'passive investors' and not
privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of control to
'entrepreneurs.'" 31  While acknowledging that such transactions were
exempt from registration," 2 the Court stressed that "there is no compara-
304. See infra notes 305-21 and accompanying text.
305. See infra notes 308-15 and accompanying text.
306. Registration of the initial offering under the 1933 Act can be avoided on the basis
of the private offering exemption, § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(2) (1988), or
Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-08 (1994). Registration under the 1934 Act is likewise
inapposite, since it pertains only to securities that are publicly traded. See generally 1
HAZEN, supra note 52, § 9.2.
307 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988) [hereinafter § 17(a)].
308. See supra note 1 (providing text of § 10(b)). Section 17(c) specifically makes the
registration exemptions inapplicable to § 17(a). See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(c) (1988).
309. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
310. Landreth Timber Co. v Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 692 (1985).
311. Id.
312. Id.
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ble exemption from the anti-fraud provisions." 13  Similarly, in its
decision in Superntendent of Insurance v Bankers' Life & Casualty
Co. ,314 the Court held that section 10(b) reaches fraud "whether conduct-
ed in the organized markets or face to face."
315
When it comes to transactions off the public markets, the Supreme
Court's longstanding refrain that private rule lOb-5 actions serve as "a
supplement to Commission action" '316 holds especially true. The SEC
concentrates on the public markets not only because of limited resources
but also because in general it lacks, with respect to transactions exempt
from registration, both oversight of and access to the materials distributed
to investors concerning which a charge of fraud might conceivably be
directed. Contract law derailment of private actions involving these
transactions therefore moves in the direction of conferring on them the
fraud exemption that Congress so painstakingly withheld.
B. Customer-Broker Disputes
The mandatory arbitration clauses declared enforceable in McMah-
on" are currently found in close to 40% of cash accounts with brokerage
houses as well as in essentially all margin and option accounts.3" '
McMahon thus reduced the number of litigated cases against brokers, and
hence the number of judicial decisions addressing customer-broker
disputes. This reduced body of case precedent creates cause for concern
that arbitrators will have only limited guidance l9 for their decisions. 20
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THE TROJAN HORSE OF RULE lOb-5
[W]ithout the benefit of guidelines derived from case-generated prece-
dent, arbitration decisions will definitely lack a uniform response to
issues and tis lack of predictability can impact on the integrity of the
system. Perhaps most importantly, the case law may stagnate and
lose its ability to respond dynamically to changes m the world of
securities.
32'
Rule lOb-5's development in this area will be only further imperiled if
contract law succeeds in derailing those cases against brokers that still
remain in the federal courts.
Thus, the functioning of the federal securities laws is impaired when
rule lOb-5 actions involving the statute of frauds, merger clauses, and
attorneys' fees clauses are derailed. This consequence compounds the
inappropriateness of incorporating these contract devices into rule lOb-5.
Conclusion
Courts today frequently derail private rule 10b-5 actions by using
traditional contract devices such as the statute of frauds, merger clauses,
and attorneys' fees clauses. Yet remarkably, these courts give scant heed
to the real world in which investors function. Thus, no consideration is
given to whether a statute of frauds requirement is practical for securities
transactions, despite the fact that the American Law Institute at present has
slated this requirement for elimnation from Article 8 of the UCC
specifically because of its impracticality Nor do courts question the
reasonableness of expecting an investor to ferret out a merger clause from
a voluminous offering document of considerable complexity Finally, no
serious assessment is made regarding whether the enforcement of attorneys'
fees clauses carries deleterious practical consequences, such as the
discouragement of lawsuits or the penalizing of investors who sue and lose.
Moreover, importing contract devices into rule lOb-5 involves
jurisprudential difficulties as well. A contract device is entitled to a place
in rule lOb-5 only if it has a firm anchor in the language, history, or
policies of the federal securities laws. Yet when importing the statute of
frauds, merger clauses, and attorneys' fees clauses into rule lOb-5, courts
rely on efficiency rationales and disregard the statutory text.
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The federal securities laws were necessary in the first place because
those who dealt with investors abused the freedom that they enjoyed under
the common law Courts should resist allowing them to resurrect that
freedom under the auspices of law-and-economics.
